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ABSTRACT
Reinforcement learning (RL) has achieved tremendous progress in solving various sequential decision-
making problems, e.g., control tasks in robotics. However, RL methods often fail to generalize to
safety-critical scenarios since policies are overfitted to training environments. Previously, robust
adversarial reinforcement learning (RARL) was proposed to train an adversarial network that applies
disturbances to a system, which improves robustness in test scenarios. A drawback of neural-network-
based adversaries is that integrating system requirements without handcrafting sophisticated reward
signals is difficult. Safety falsification methods allow one to find a set of initial conditions as well as
an input sequence, such that the system violates a given property formulated in temporal logic. In this
paper, we propose falsification-based RARL (FRARL), the first generic framework for integrating
temporal-logic falsification in adversarial learning to improve policy robustness. With falsification
method, we do not need to construct an extra reward function for the adversary. We evaluate our
approach on a braking assistance system and an adaptive cruise control system of autonomous
vehicles. Experiments show that policies trained with a falsification-based adversary generalize better
and show less violation of the safety specification in test scenarios than the ones trained without an
adversary or with an adversarial network.
Keywords Adversarial Learning, Formal Methods, Reinforcement Learning
1 Introduction
Recent advancements, such as superhuman performance in a range of Atari games in 2015 [1], followed by AlphaGo’s
victory against the human world champion in Go in 2016 [2,3], have created a lot of interest in Reinforcement Learning
(RL) [4]. Since then, RL has made great progress, e.g., in real-world applications such as robotics [5], natural language
processing [6], and autonomous driving [7]. However, RL still suffers from shortcomings like bad generalization in
real-world scenarios, risk-sensitive reward functions, and violation of safety constraints [8, 9]. This paper addresses the
generalization problem caused by the huge amount of data required for RL.
Generalization is addressed by Pinto et al. [10], by adding disturbances as adversarial examples [11], which was
later extended by Pan et al. [12]. By training with adversarial examples, they reduce the simulation-to-reality gap
caused by modeling errors. Therefore, the trained models generalize better in real-world scenarios. Adversarial RL is
formulated as a two-player zero-sum game in [10, 12], where an adversary aims to obstruct the success of the learning
system. However, learning in a zero-sum game requires finding a Nash equilibrium, which is especially challenging
for continuous, high-dimensional problems [13]. Otherwise, if we formulate the problem as a non-zero-sum game, in
which the adversary optimizes a different reward function, a sophisticated reward function for the adversary would have
to be handcrafted. For instance, expressing traffic rule: a vehicle is not allowed to overtake another vehicle on its right
side except in congested traffic requires a sequence of events, which is difficult to integrate in a reward function, while
temporal logic can easily represent it with temporal operators.
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In this paper, we propose a new framework: we create adversarial samples in a single RL-agent setting, wherein the
protagonist is represented as an RL-agent, while safety falsification methods act as an adversary. Safety falsification
approaches drive a system to unsafe behaviors, which violate given safety specifications [14]. The safety specifications
can be formulated in Metric Temporal Logic [15], as detailed in Section 3.1.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2 provides an overview of current solutions for adversarial
RL and system falsification for safety-critical systems. Section 3 introduces falsification-based RARL, which is
evaluated in Section 4. We finish with conclusions and potential future research directions in Section 5.
2 RELATED WORK
2.1 Adversarial Reinforcement Learning
Despite the success of RL algorithms, they are susceptible to changes in environmental settings [9, 16]. Hence,
various forms of adversarial training [11] have been introduced to tackle this problem. One such approach involves
adding adversarial perturbations to the observations of the agent, by attacking either only the image inputs [17–19], or
addressing the entire state vector [20, 21]. Another approach involves the use of source-domain ensembles, which is
adapted to the target domain using Bayesian model adaptation [22].
The approach most relevant to our work is the minimax approach extending Robust RL [16]. This approach, known
as Robust Adversarial RL (RARL) [10], simultaneously trains two RL agents: one referred to as the protagonist and
the other one referred to as the adversary. The adversary is tasked with applying destabilising forces to impede the
protagonist, while the protagonist learns to be robust against the adversary. An extension of this work has been provided
by Risk-Averse RARL (RARARL) [12], which focuses on safety-critical cyber-physical systems, by modeling the
risk as the variance of an ensemble of value functions. In contrast to RARL and RARARL that model the setup as a
two-agent reinforcement learning scenario, as mentioned in the previous section, our proposed solution reduces the
number of reward functions to be defined and tuned, requires less parameters of the adversary to be optimized, and
allows for better expressiveness for the adversary using temporal logic specifications.
2.2 Safety Falsification
Safety falsification methods aim to find an initial condition and input sequences, with which a system violates a given
safety specification. Two categories of various approaches exist to tackle this problem. We first present single-shooting
methods, which simulate trajectories from specific initial conditions and input traces and iterate until a falsifying
trajectory is found. Single-shooting is realized through Monte-Carlo techniques in [14,23,24], Ant-Colony Optimization
in [25], Cross-Entropy method in [26], and Rapidly-exploring Random Tree search in [27–30]. A multiple-shooting
approach is proposed in [31, 32] to split system trajectories into small segments by simulating from multiple initial
conditions in a cell-abstraction of the state space. Once one segment reaches an unsafe state, the cell size is refined
until the segments can be concatenated into a complete system trajectory. The Ant-Colony method and Monte-Carlo
Sampling are compared in [25] for two benchmarks and obtain similar results. The Cross-Entropy method outperfoms
Monte-Carlo Sampling on five different benchmarks, as shown in [26]. Hence, we employ Cross-Entropy method in
this work. Note that our framework can use other falsification approaches as well.
3 FALSIFICATION-BASED RARL
3.1 Safety Falsification
In order to formulate the safety falsification problem, we first introduce important definitions adopted from [14]. A
dynamic system Σ can be regarded as a mapping from initial states x0 ∈ X0 ⊂ X and input signals u ∈ U ⊆ Rm to
output signals y ∈ Y ⊆ Rk: X0 × U → Y .
We formulate system properties in Metric Temporal Logic (MTL) [15]. Temporal logic combines propositions of
classical logics with time dependence such that a truth value is assigned to each atomic proposition at each time
instant [33]. An atomic proposition p is a statement that can be either true or false. Atomic propositions and the
logical connectives, e.g., Boolean operators not and or denoted by ¬ and ∨, form propositional formulas. The temporal
operator until, denoted by U , indicates that in a formula ϕ1U ϕ2, the first formula ϕ1 holds until the second formula
ϕ2 holds; the time t when ϕ2 starts to hold is unconstrained, i.e., t ∈ (0,∞). MTL is an extension of temporal logic in
which temporal operators are replaced by time-constrained operators. So that U is replaced by UI , where I ⊆ (0,∞),
indicating that t is constrained by I . The syntax of an MTL formula ϕ is defined as follows [24]:
ϕ := true | p | ¬ϕ |ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2 |ϕ1UI ϕ2, (1)
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which indicates that the value of an MTL formula is always true or false.
Definition. MTL Falsification. For an MTL specification ϕ, the MTL falsification problem aims to find initial states
x0 ∈ X0 as well as an input sequence u : [0, T ] → U such that the resulting trajectory y of system Σ violates the
specification ϕ, which is denoted by
y(x0,u, t) 6|= ϕ. (2)
Naïve falsification samples the set of initial conditions and input sequences uniformly over the whole space. A more
efficient approach is to guide the search for a falsifying input set with a metric that measures the distance between
the trajectory and the set of states violating the specification. A robustness metric ε is proposed in [34] to express
the satisfaction of an MTL property over a given trajectory as a real number, instead of a Boolean value (0 for no
intersection with unsafe sets, 1 for successful falsification). The sign of ε reveals whether a trajectory y satisfies an
MTL property ϕ. The robustness of y with respect to ϕ is denoted by
ε = JϕKd(y, t), (3)
where d is the distance between two states x1,x2 ∈ X and is typically defined as the Euclidean distance for continuous
systems:
d(x1,x2) = ||x1 − x2||2. (4)
The robustness evaluation for the MTL syntax given in (1) is defined as [24–26]:JtrueKd(y, t) := +∞JpKd(y, t) := Distd(y(t),O(p))J¬ϕKd(y, t) := −JϕKd(y, t)Jϕ1 ∨ ϕ2Kd(y, t) := max(Jϕ1Kd(y, t), Jϕ2Kd(y, t))Jϕ1UI ϕ2Kd(y, t) := sup
t′∈(t+I)
min(Jϕ2Kd(y, t′),
inf
t<t′′<t′
Jϕ1Kd(y, t′′)),
(5)
where O(p) is the set where p is fulfilled. The signed distance denoted by Distd is defined as
Distd(y,O) :=
{ − inf{d(y, x) |x ∈ O} if y /∈ O
inf{d(y, x) |x ∈ X \ O} if y ∈ O (6)
Consequently, (2) can be defined as a minimization problem:
min
x0∈X0,u:[0,T ]→U
JϕKd(y(x0,u), t). (7)
The Cross-Entropy method combines piecewise-uniform distributions and Gaussian distributions to approximate the
underlying distribution of the robustness value in (3) over the set X0 × U [26]. The proposed distribution is denoted by
pθ with parameter θ, the unknown real distribution by q. The distance between two distributions is measured by the
Kullback-Leibler Divergence [35]:
D(q, pθ) =
∫
X0×U
log
(
q(ξ)
pθ(ξ)
)
q(ξ) dξ, (8)
with ξ ∈ X0 × U . Since the actual distribution q is unknown, D(q, pθ) is estimated using Ns sampled data points,
which are chosen by the current approximation pθ. Those samples are sorted by their robustness values and the m least
robust samples are taken, with m Ns. Then, parameter θ is updated by minimizing the divergence D(q, pθ) over m
data samples. This procedure iterates until the divergence converges to a threshold. Subsequently, initial conditions and
input sequences are sampled according to the converged distribution pθ.
In this work, we consider two safety requirements (R) for the system. R1: The agent is not allowed to collide with the
leading vehicle. R2: The agent is not allowed to drive backwards on the highway. We formulate R1 and R2 as follows:
(¬ϕcollision ∧ ¬ϕreverse), (9)
where is the temporal operator globally, indicating that formula ϕmust hold at all time. Note that the proposed method
can be directly applied to more complicated specifications containing temporal operators like until and eventually.
Future work will integrate more traffic rules in the system requirements as proposed by [36–38].
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Figure 1: Falsification-based RARL framework. The RL agent and environment are regarded as the black box system
Σ. Falsification model serves as the adversary, which provides input sets x0 and u for the environment such that the
system trajectory falsifies MTL specifications. The RL agent is trained further under the falsified environment.
3.2 Falsification-Based RARL
Fig. 1 shows our framework of falsification-based RARL and Algorithm ?? presents our approach in detail. We
formulate our RL problem as a Markov Decision Process (MDP) with a 5-tuple (S,A, P,R, γ), where S is the state
space, A is the action space, P is the state transition probability, R is the expected reward signal, and γ ∈ [0, 1] is
the discount factor. The left part of Fig. 1 describes the learning process of the RL policy. The agent acts on the
environment, followed by updating its state and reward. Our experiments reveal that the policy converges slower if the
adversary interferes too early, as [12] also observes. Therefore, we first train the agent for tf time steps without an
adversary, as shown in Algorithm ?? line 2-8 and Fig. 3. Next, we regard our trained model and the environment as a
black box system Σ. As shown in the right part of Fig. 1, we employ the previously-mentioned Cross-Entropy method
to find initial conditions and input sequences for the environment (the behavior of other vehicles) under which the agent
violates our MTL specification (9). We initialize our environment with those initial conditions, change the behavior
according to the new input sequences, and train the policy further in the new adversarial environment (line 13). This
procedure repeats until the policy converges to zero violation.
Algorithm 1: Falsification-Based RARL
Input: Training steps T ; environment E; number of actors na; time steps each actor runs at each iteration ta; MTL
specification ϕ; time step to start falsification tf ; number of falsification iterations nf
Initialize: Parameters of policy and value network φ0
Result: Trained policy and value network φ
1 while t < T do
2 for actor = 1, 2, ..., na do
3 Run policy φold in E for ta time steps ;
4 Compute advantage estimates Aˆ1, ..., Aˆta (20);
5 end
6 Optimize surrogate LCLIP+VF (10) wrt. φ with batch size nata ;
7 φold ← φ ;
8 t = t+ nata ;
9 if t > tf then
10 Initialize falsifier parameter θ0 ;
11 for iter = 1, 2, ..., nf do
12 Sample input conditions x0,u from pθold ;
13 Initialize new environment Eiter with x0, change the behavior of Eiter with u ;
14 Collect trajectories y in Eiter with agent φold and evaluate robustness value according to (3) ;
15 Estimate (8) with y and minimize (8) wrt. θ ;
16 θold ← θ ;
17 end
18 E ← E(x0,u) ;
19 end
20 end
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We choose proximal policy optimization (PPO) [39] to optimize the policy network due to its su-
perior performance in continuous control problems compared to other state-of-the-art approaches.
We use an actor-critic architecture [40] to approximate both the policy and the value func-
tion with neural networks to reduce variance. The objective function for the optimization is:
LCLIP+VF(φ) = Eˆt
[
LCLIPt (φ)− cLVFt (φ)
]
,with (10a)
LCLIP(φ) = Eˆt
[
min(rt(θ)Aˆt, clip(rt(θ), 1− , 1 + )Aˆt)
]
(10b)
LVFt (φ) = (Vφ(st)− V targt )2, (10c)
where the probability ratio rt(φ) =
piφ(at|st)
piφold(at|st)
, piφold are the old policies before the update, c and  are hyper-
parameters, Vφ is the estimated value function, V
targ
t is the target value function collected through Monte-Carlo
simulations, clip is an operator to limit the operand in a given range, and Eˆt[...] is the empirical average over a finite
batch of samples. The advantage function Aˆt is estimated by a general advantage estimator (GAE) [41] as follows:
Aˆt = δt + (γλ)δt+1 + ...+ ...+ (γλ)
T−t+1δT−1, (11)
with δt = rt + γV (st+1)− V (st), (12)
where λ ∈ [0, 1] is a discount factor of the advantage estimator and makes a compromise between variance and bias.
We use λ = 0.95 here. More training details are provided in Section 4.3.
4 EXPERIMENTS
We test our approach in two systems. The first one is a braking assistance (BA) system of an autonomous vehicle to
avoid rear-end collisions and avoid driving reversely on a highway. The second one is an adaptive cruise control (ACC)
system that keeps a safe distance to the leading vehicle and follows a desired velocity. The two systems are implemented
in the same traffic simulator with different reward functions described in Section 4.2. To fairly evaluate the performance
of our approach, we train each system in three different environments: a baseline environment without an adversarial
model, an adversarial environment with an RL agent as adversary, and an adversarial environment with an adversary
using falsification method. The adversarial RL agent in the second environment is trained using RARL [10]. We choose
RARL over the more recent RARARL [12] to train the adversarial RL agent because RARARL was proposed to tackle
discrete action space. RARARL can not be directly applied to policy gradient methods. We call the policy that controls
the ego vehicle the protagonist as [10] does.
4.1 Dataset
In the adversarial environments, the behavior of the leading vehicle is altered by the falsification method or an adversarial
RL agent. The baseline environment could be realized by either rule-based driver models, e.g., the intelligent driver
model (IDM) [42], or real traffic data. A limitation of rule-based driver models is their homogeneity. The policy could
easily overfit to reacting only to a particular behavior such that it fails to generalize, while driving behaviors from real
traffic are more diverse. Therefore, we choose the recently published HighD dataset of naturalistic vehicle trajectories
on German highways [43].
HighD recorded 16.5 h of video at six locations using a drone and extracted more than 45 000 km of vehicle trajectories
at 25 Hz using computer vision algorithms. Since the longitudinal driving behavior of a lane-changing vehicle is
different from the behavior of a lane-following vehicle, we filter out the trajectories of all lane-changing vehicles. There
are 97 184 lane-following trajectories in the HighD dataset. The distribution of the total length of these trajectories
is shown in the frequency histogram in Fig. 2. In order to avoid overfitting, each trajectory should be used maximal
once during training. In addition, the original traffic scenarios cover a lane of 420 m length with a median duration
of 13.6 s for each vehicle. With this setting, the ego vehicle is less likely to encounter a critical situation. Hence, we
extend the lane length to 600 m and the total time of one scenario to 20 s, i.e., 500 time steps. Therefore, to obtain
sufficient trajectories, we select the longitudinal acceleration signals of lane-following trajectories with a total length
L ≥ 250, cut the signals to 250 length, and append the signals with reversely duplicated signals. In total, we obtain
93 454 trajectories and separate them into 70 % trajectories for training and 30 % trajectories for testing.
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Figure 2: Frequency histogram of the length of lane-following trajectories in HighD dataset [43].
4.2 Environment
We set up a driving simulator based on the CommonRoad benchmark suite [44] and OpenAI Gym [45]. Since the
goal of the agent is to learn the longitudinal driving behavior, our simulator contains only a straight lane with length
600 m. An episode terminates if the leading vehicle reaches the end of the lane, the maximal time step 500 is reached,
a collision happens, or the ego vehicle drives in reverse. Both vehicles are driven according to a point-mass model.
The one-dimensional continuous action of the following vehicle (the ego vehicle) is its acceleration, which is sampled
from the policy network. In order to assure that the scenario is solvable, the leading vehicle is initially at least as
far away from the ego vehicle as the safe distance. We assume both vehicles have the same maximum deceleration
amax = 10 m/s
2. The safe distance is then computed according to [46] as
ssafe =
1
2amax
(v2f − v2l ) + vfδ, (13)
where vf and vl are the velocities of the following and leading vehicles respectively, and δ is the reaction delay of the
following vehicle. We use δ = 0.3 s, as assumed by [46] for autonomous vehicles.
The initial position of the ego vehicle is fixed at sego = 10 m, whereas the initial position of the leading vehicle is either
randomly sampled in range [sego + ssafe, sego + ssafe + 40] in the baseline environment and in the RL adversarial
environment, or calculated by the falsification tool in the falsification adversarial environment. Acceleration and initial
velocity of the leading vehicle are either extracted from the selected HighD trajectories, or computed by the adversaries,
i.e., in (7) x0 corresponds to the initial position and velocity of the leading vehicle and u corresponds to the acceleration
of the leading vehicle. Note that falsifying the initial position and velocity of the leading vehicle is sufficient for the
initial states, since varying these two states directly changes the initial distance and relative velocity, which are crucial
for collision avoidance at the initial time step.
Since maintaining a safe distance to the leading vehicle is crucial for collision avoidance, the feature vector of the policy
networks needs to provide all necessary information to calculate the safe distance. We choose the feature vector for
both systems as listed in Tab. 1. The collision feature is added to encourage collision-avoidance behavior.
The reward function of the BA protagonist is defined in (14) and consists of two parts: the crash reward rcrash and
the alive reward ralive. To switch among these two cases, we define two binary variables: 1collision and 1reverse, with
1collision = 1 when two vehicles collide and 1reverse = 1 when the ego vehicle drives reversely.
rBA = rcrash + ralive (14a)
rcrash = −10 (1collision ∨ 1reverse) (14b)
ralive = 0.1 (¬1collision ∧ ¬1reverse) (14c)
The reward function of the ACC protagonist is defined as:
rACC = rcrash + rclose + rslow + ralive (15a)
rcrash = −10 (1collision ∨ 1reverse) (15b)
rclose = − exp
(−5 s
ssafe
)
· 1close (15c)
rslow = −0.5 exp
(−5 vego
vleading
)
· 1slow (15d)
ralive = 0.1 (¬1slow ∧ ¬1close ∧ ¬1collision ∧ ¬1reverse) (15e)
rcrash and ralive are the same as in rBA. Two additional terms are added: rclose penalizes a violation of the safe
distance with a nonlinear function which increases the penalization as the ego vehicle gets closer to the leading
6
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Table 1: Features used by policy network
Feature Units Description
s m distance to leading vehicle
vego − vleading m/s relative velocity to leading vehicle
vego m/s velocity of ego vehicle
aleading m/s
2 acceleration of leading vehicle
aego m/s
2 acceleration of ego vehicle
1collision boolean if two vehicles collide
vehicle; rslow penalizes the ego vehicle for driving slower than the leading vehicle if the distance is greater than
the safe distance. Two additional binary variables are defined as 1close = s < ssafe ∧ ¬1collision ∧ ¬1reverse and
1slow = vego < vleading ∧¬1close ∧¬1collision ∧¬1reverse. The goal of the adversarial policy is to minimize the reward
of the protagonist. Therefore, we choose radv = −rBA and radv = −rACC as the reward functions of the adversarial
policies for the BA system and for the ACC system.
4.3 Baseline Model
As mentioned in Section 3.2, we train our policies and value functions with PPO [39] and an actor-critic algorithm [40].
In particular, we use a shared network design to share features between the policy and the value function. We build our
models on top of the OpenAI Baselines implementation [47]. The shared policy and value network has two hidden
layers with 64 neurons each and tanh as activation function. The model is optimized using the Adam optimizer [48]
with a learning rate of 0.0003 and a batch size of 128.
In all experiments, we first train the protagonist policy without the adversary for 390 000 training steps to let it learn
basic skills as suggested in [12]. In the RL adversarial environment, we update the parameters of the protagonist θµ to
maximize rBA or rACC for Nµ = 10 iterations while the parameters of the adversary θν are kept constant. Then we
hold θµ constant and update θν forNµ = 1 iteration to maximize radv. Nµ andNµ are chosen empirically. This process
iterates until both policies converge. In the falsification adversarial environment, we apply S-Taliro [49] to falsify the
protagonist during training. S-Taliro is a MATLAB toolbox for MTL falsification for hybrid systems. S-Taliro is called
every 10 iterations to compute 10 acceleration traces and initial positions and velocities for the leading vehicle, with
which the protagonist falsifies the given specification (9). The computed traces are randomly picked by the simulator
to train the policy further. In the following part, we call the baseline model PPO, the policy model trained with a RL
adversarial agent RARL, and the policy model trained with our method FRARL.
4.4 Evaluation
During the training phase, policies are set to be stochastic to encourage exploration, whereas during the evaluation as
well as the falsification phase, deterministic policies are used. In order to fairly compare the robustness of the three
models, 10 policies with different random seeds are trained for each method. Since the agent is destined to encounter
low reward in the training scenarios of the adversarial environments, we evaluate the learning progress of all models in
the HighD test scenarios instead.
We regard a model as robust if it satisfies the safety specification (9) in unseen scenarios, i.e., the test scenarios. In order
to evaluate how well the model satisfies (9), we use rcrash in (14) and (15) as catastrophe reward. Fig. 3 shows the total
and catastrophe reward in test scenarios of the BA and ACC system trained with PPO, RARL, and FRARL. For the
BA system, FRARL shows slightly higher total reward than the other two methods and converges to zero catastrophe
reward already at half of the training steps. For the ACC system, FRARL shows lower total reward, but achieves zero
catastrophe reward with zero variance in the end, while the other two models still violate the safety specification.
To further address the robustness of the trained models, we evaluate all models in 28 037 test scenarios and show the
average rate of reverse driving and collisions in Tab. 2. For both systems, FRARL achieves the lowest number of
violations of the safety specification. Surprisingly, RARL shows even higher collision rate than PPO. We observe that
two of the 10 models trained with RARL cause the majority of collisions. Even without these two models, RARL still
has higher collision rate than FRARL. The reason is that an adversarial RL agent seeks scenarios where the reward of
the policy stays low, but not necessarily safety-critical scenarios. Thus, after a policy converges to a good behavior,
a further increase of its safety becomes much more difficult for RARL. Instead, falsification method optimizes the
7
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Figure 3: Total reward curves and catastrophe reward curves on the testing scenarios of BA system and ACC system
trained with PPO, RARL, and FRARL. FRARL shows slightly higher total reward for BA system and lower total
reward for ACC system than the other two methods. However, only FRARL achieves zero catastrophe reward with zero
variance in the end, which shows FRARL satisfies (9) better and thus is more robust.
scenarios until safety-critical scenarios are found. Therefore, the policies trained in safety-critical scenarios behave
much safer than the other policies.
5 CONCLUSIONS
We present a framework for combining reinforcement learning (RL) with safety falsification methods, which serves
as adversarial RL, in order to improve the robustness of trained policies. By formulating safety requirements in
metric temporal logics (MTL), we spare ourselves the trouble of handcrafting a reward function for the adversary. We
demonstrate for a braking assistance system and an adaptive cruise control system that the policies trained with our
approach satisfy the safety specification much better in test scenarios, and thus are more robust. In the future, we will
extend our experiments to more complex driving scenarios, e.g., urban scenarios. Moreover, we will integrate traffic
rules in our MTL specifications.
Table 2: Average Rate of Violations over 28 037 test scenarios
BA ACC
Violation Reverse Collision Reverse Collision
PPO 0.14% 5.53% 0.01% 0.3%
RARL 0.034% 7.23% 0 1.34%
FRARL 0 0.0082% 0 0.0011%
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